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Abstract
In the context of team production, this paper studies the optimal
(deterministic and stochastic) information allocation that implements
desired effort levels as the unique Bayesian equilibrium. We show that,
under certain conditions, it is optimal to asymmetrically inform agents
even though they may be ex ante symmetric. The main intuition is
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that informing the agents asymmetrically can be effective in avoiding
“bad” equilibria, that is, equilibria with coordination failure.
KEYWORDS: Moral hazard, Unique implementation, Asymmetric
information allocation
JEL Classification: D21, D23, D86
1 Introduction
In the context of the team-production problem of Holmstrom (1982), Winter
(2004) finds that an asymmetric bonus contract may be optimal in uniquely
implementing desired effort levels, even with homogeneous agents.1 To un-
derstand its key intuition, imagine a principal who designs a bonus scheme
to make two agents play high efforts in its unique equilibrium, and that the
probability of successful outcomes is increasing and supermodular in their
total efforts. To eliminate low-effort equilibria, the principal needs to offer a
high-enough bonus scheme to one of the agents, say agent 1. On the other
1Asymmetric bonus contracts are usually suboptimal if the principal employs a wishful
thinking in equilibrium selection. Unique implementation, on the other hand, may be a
reasonable concern, for example, when lower effort levels significantly increase the proba-
bility of hazardous outcomes, and the principal does not have full control over equilibrium
selection. For example, Kreps (1990) and Cronqvist, Low, and Nilsson (2007) argue that
which equilibrium is to be played may be determined by the “corporate culture”, which is
usually difficult to fully control. Baliga and Sjostrom (1998) consider collusive behaviors
in moral hazard. See Ma (1988), Arya, Glover, and Hughes (1997), and Winter (2004)
for studies of optimal contracts that uniquely implement the desired effort choice under
various assumptions. Winter (2004) is the closest to ours in that he considers the team-
production model of Holmstrom (1982).
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hand, given this, the principal does not need to offer such a high bonus scheme
to agent 2. Because the success probability is supermodular in total effort,
the fact that agent 1 plays a high effort makes agent 2’s incentive constraint
less stringent. Thus, the optimal bonus contract is asymmetric. Similar
“divide-and-conquer” nature of optimal contracts also appear in other con-
texts. For example, see Segal (2003) in the context of bilateral contracting
with externalities.2
Although the design of a bonus scheme is important in the optimal orga-
nization design, there are other important aspects as well. This paper studies
the optimal information allocation in this context. More specifically, we con-
sider a situation in which the probability of success is not only a function of
total effort, but also a function of the (exogenously given) uncertain state.
The principal decides which agent observes the realization of this state (as
well as the bonus scheme).
Observing the realized state obviously affects this “informed” agent’s ef-
fort incentive: better state realization makes him play a high effort with
less bonus, and vice versa. However, even if an agent does not observe the
state (“uninformed”), if he knows that the other agent observes the state,
that knowledge could affect his incentive. For example, imagine the bonus
level such that the informed agent plays a high effort in the good state. In
view of the uninformed agent, this means that the informed agent will play
a high effort with some positive probability. This fact along with the super-
modularity of the success-probability function makes the uninformed agent’s
incentive constraint less stringent. Indeed, under certain parameter values,
2The term “divide-and-conquer” also appears in Segal (2003).
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we find that such asymmetric information allocation is better than informing
no agent or both agents.
In this sense, the optimal information allocation has features similar to the
optimal bonus scheme in that treating homogeneous agents asymmetrically
may be effective in avoiding bad-coordination equilibria, but there are some
important differences too; for example, (i) providing information implies bet-
ter incentive in the good state, but it also implies worse incentive in the bad
state; in contrast, (ii) providing higher bonus unambiguously improves the
agent’s incentive. Because of this difference, the optimal information struc-
ture is asymmetric only under certain parameter values. Indeed, if the cost
of allocating more information, that is, the deterioration of incentive in the
bad state, is significant, then asymmetric information allocation is subopti-
mal. The main result of the paper establishes a clear connection between
the optimal information allocation and the shape of the success-probability
function.3
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, and
Section 3 studies the optimal bonus contract and information structure in
a simple two-agent case with anonymous contracts. To highlight the main
intuition, Section 3 only considers deterministic information allocation, that
is, each agent is either fully informed of the realized state, or not informed
3In various contexts, it is observed that asymmetric information sometimes mitigates
incentive problems or shrinks the set of equilibria (see, for example, Bergemann and
Pesendorfer (2007) in optimal auction, Morris and Shin (2002) in coordination games,
Schmitz (2006) and Goldlucke and Schmitz (2014) in pre-contracting investments). We
make a step forward by characterizing the optimal information allocation in the team-
production context.
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at all. Section 4 considers all (possibly stochastic) information allocations.
Although this case is much harder, the optimal stochastic information struc-
ture is similar to the optimal deterministic information structure in that
information is given in an asymmetric manner. Furthermore, they coincide
under certain parameter values. Section 5 concludes the paper. Although we
only consider a simple environment for brevity, the conclusion of this paper
is robust in a number of extensions and generalizations, such as more than
two agents, asymmetric bonus contracts, and asymmetric characteristics of
agents. Interested readers may consult our working paper version Moriya
and Yamashita (2016).
2 Model
We consider a team-production model with one manager (a principal) and
two workers (agents) engaged in a project. Each worker i = 1, 2 simultane-
ously chooses an effort level ei ∈ {0, 1}, which costs cei for c > 0. The profit
of the project is y ∈ {S, F} (S > F ). Let pθ(x) denote the probability of
success (y = S), which depends on the agents’ total effort x = e1 + e2 and
task environment θ ∈ {H,L}. We assume that pθ(x) is increasing in x for
any θ. The prior probability for each θ is fθ ∈ (0, 1) with fH + fL = 1. Let
pφ(x) = fHpH(x) + fLpL(x) denote the mean success probability, given x.
The marginal productivity of effort, denoted by piθ(x) ≡ pθ(x)−pθ(x−1),
satisfies (i) piH(x) > piL(x) for all x and (ii) piθ(x) > piθ(x− 1) for all x and θ.
The first condition requires that the marginal productivity is always higher in
state H than in state L, and the second condition requires that the agents’
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efforts are complementary; thus the agents’ collaboration is important for
success.
The main choice variable of the principal is the agents’ information struc-
ture. In Section 3, we only consider deterministic information structures,
which simply refers to how many agents are informed of θ before they make
effort choices, represented by m = 0, 1, 2.4 A possible interpretation is that
the principal controls each agent’s cost of acquiring information on θ (al-
though he himself does not observe θ). Once the principal chooses an infor-
mation structure m = 0, 1, 2, we assume that this structure becomes common
knowledge among the agents. A bonus contract can be contingent only on
the outcome, and is assumed to be the same for both agents:5 each agent
earns bonus b ≥ 0 if y = S, while he earns 0 if y = F .
Let si ∈ Si = {H,L, φ} represent agent i’s information about the state.
More specifically, (i) if he is informed, then si = θ for each θ, and (ii) if
he is uninformed, then si = φ for each θ. Hence, agent i’s strategy is to
choose ei(si) ∈ {0, 1} for each si. Given bonus b and the agents’ effort profile
e = (e1, e2) ∈ {0, 1}2, agent i’s payoff in state θ is ui(e, θ; b) = bpθ(e1 +
e2)− cei. Thus, given the information structure, the agents’ strategy profile
e = (ei(si))i,si is a (pure-strategy Bayesian) equilibrium if (i) for each i who
4In Section 4, we consider a general (stochastic) information structure.
5We restrict our attention to these symmetric bonus contracts for simplicity of analysis.
As shown by Winter (2004), in general, this restriction is with loss of generality. Never-
theless, the qualitative features of the optimal information allocation (e.g., optimality
of asymmetric information allocation under certain parameter values) do not essentially
change even if we allow for asymmetric bonus contracts. See Remark 1 at the end of
Section 3 and our working paper version Moriya and Yamashita (2016).
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is informed: for each θ ∈ {H,L} and e′i ∈ {0, 1},
ui(ei(θ), e−i(s−i), θ; b) ≥ ui(e′i, e−i(s−i), θ; b),
and (ii) for each i who is uninformed: for each e′i ∈ {0, 1},
E[ui(ei(φ), e−i(s−i), θ; b)] ≥ E[ui(e′i, e−i(s−i), θ; b)].
As standard in the literature, we assume that S is sufficiently larger than
F so that the principal’s goal is to implement the full-effort strategy profile,
that is, e = (ei(si))i,si such that ei(si) = 1 for all i and si.
Benchmark: Full-effort strategy profile as one of the equilibria We
first derive the optimal contract that makes the full-effort strategy profile
one of the equilibria and observe that m = 0 (no information) is the optimal
information structure.
With m = 0, the full-effort strategy profile is an equilibrium if bpφ(n)−c ≥
bpφ(n − 1), or equivalently b ≥ cpiφ(n) . With m = 1 or 2, the bonus must be
sufficiently high for an informed agent to work in the low state, that is,
bpL(n) − c ≥ bpL(n − 1) or, equivalently b ≥ cpiL(n) . Therefore, m = 0
(no information) is the optimal information structure. Intuitively, this is
because we must incentivize the agents for an average state under the no-
information structure, whereas under any other information structure, we
must incentivize the informed agent for every state.6
Unique implementation The contract to implement the full-effort strat-
egy profile as one of the equilibria implicitly assumes that the agents would
6This argument is well-known in the literature. See Myerson (1983).
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play the best equilibrium in view of the principal, even if there are multiple
equilibria in the contract. However, in case failure of the project is extremely
hazardous (e.g., accidents in a nuclear power plant, loss of a brand’s long-
term reputation, and so on), the principal may not want to follow such a
wishful thinking. Rather, it may be more reasonable to require that the
full-effort strategy profile is a unique equilibrium.
Given each information structure m, let bm ∈ R+ denote the infimum level
of bonus with which the full-effort strategy profile is a unique equilibrium.7
We say that m is the optimal information structure if bm ≤ bm′ for any other
information structure m′.
Before the formal analysis, we first illustrate the main intuition in the
following simple example.
Example 1. In the good state, each agent earns expected payoff 10 if both
agents work, 7 if he shirks but the other works, 6 if he works but the other
shirks, and 5 if both shirk. In the bad state, each agent earns 3 if both agents
work, 4 if he shirks but the other works, 1 if he works but the other shirks,
and 2 if both shirk.8
(“good”) work shirk
work (10, 10) (6, 7)
shirk (7, 6) (5, 5)
(“bad”) work shirk
work (5, 5) (1, 4)
shirk (4, 1) (3, 3)
Each state is equally likely, and hence, if no agent is informed about
the state, then “both work” and “both shirk” are equilibria, which is not
7Winter (2004) calls it the incentive-inducing contract (for the full-effort strategy pro-
file).
8One can interpret these numbers as the agents’ expected utilities given an arbitrarily
fixed bonus contract.
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desirable for the principal. Informing both agents about the state is not
desirable either, because “both shirk” is again an equilibrium in the bad
state.
Nevertheless, informing just one agent can eliminate this bad coordina-
tion. Specifically, suppose that only agent 2 is informed about the state,
whereas agent 1 is not (but agent 1 knows that agent 2 knows the state, and
so on). First, if the state is good, then it is strictly dominant for agent 2
to work. Given this, it is now (iteratively) strictly dominant for agent 1 to
work, as illustrated in the following table:
work in both states work only in good state
work (15
2
, 15
2
) (11
2
, 7)
shirk (11
2
, 7
2
) (5, 9
2
)
Finally, given that agent 1 works (in any state), it is (iteratively) strictly
dominant for agent 2 to work even in the bad state. Therefore, the desired
outcome that “both work in every state” is the unique strategy profile that
survives iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies.9
9In this example, one might think that (work,work) may be “selected” by the agents
even if there are multiple equilibria because it is Pareto dominant for them. As a related
point, one might also think that sequential action choices by the agents (if technologi-
cally possible) solve the problem because the “leader” agent chooses to work in order to
essentially “select” the better equilibrium. However, this is just an artifact of our sim-
ple example. In general, Pareto domination and sequential action choices could lead to
shirking behavior, while asymmetric information allocation could uniquely implement the
full-effort strategy profile. See Moriya and Yamashita (2016).
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3 Optimal deterministic information structure
We first characterize bm for each information structure m, and then examine
the optimal information structure.
3.1 m = 0 (no information)
With m = 0 where neither agent is informed, the optimal bonus contract
that implements e = (1, 1) as one of the equilibria is b = c
piφ(2)
. However,
under this contract, not only e = (1, 1), but also e = (0, 0) is an equilibrium:
if i chooses ei = 0, then it is (strictly) optimal for j to choose ej = 0.
10
Therefore, the optimal bonus level that uniquely implements e = (1, 1)
must be strictly greater than c
piφ(2)
. Specifically, for e = (0, 0) not to be an
equilibrium, we must have b > c
piφ(1)
(> c
piφ(2)
) so that an agent works even if
the other agent does not work.
Now, given b > c
piφ(1)
, a high effort is strictly dominant for each agent and,
hence, e = (0, 0) and any other effort choice (except for e = (1, 1)) cannot
be an equilibrium. Therefore, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. b0 =
c
piφ(1)
.
3.2 m = 1 (asymmetric information)
We now consider the asymmetric-information scenario m = 1, where only
one of the agents (say, agent 2) is informed. We first state the result.
10Note that the convexity of the success probability function, p, plays a key role in this
argument, as in Winter (2004).
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Lemma 2. b1 = max
{
c
piH(1)
, c
piL(2)
, c
fHpiH(2)+fLpiL(1)
}
.
Proof. We first show that, if neither (0, (0, 0)), (0, (1, 0)), nor (1, (1, 0)) is an
equilibrium with bonus b, then
b > b¯ = max
{
c
piH(1)
,
c
piL(2)
,
c
fHpiH(2) + fLpiL(1)
}
.
Indeed, first, to prevent (0, (0, 0)) from being an equilibrium, we must
have either b > c
piφ(1)
, b > c
piH(1)
, or b > c
piL(1)
. Because c
piH(1)
< c
piφ(1)
, c
piL(1)
, we
obtain b > c
piH(1)
as its necessary condition.
Given b > c
piH(1)
, to prevent (0, (1, 0)) from being an equilibrium, we must
have either b > c
fHpiH(2)+fLpiL(1)
or b > c
piL(1)
. Because c
fHpiH(2)+fLpiL(1)
< c
piL(1)
,
we obtain b > c
fHpiH(2)+fLpiL(1)
as its necessary condition.
Given b > max{ c
piH(1)
, c
fHpiH(2)+fLpiL(1)
}, to prevent (1, (1, 0)) from being
an equilibrium, we must have b > c
piL(2)
.
Now we show that, conversely, (1, (1, 1)) is uniquely implemented by any
b such that b > b¯. This completes the proof by establishing b1 = b¯. First,
because b > c
piH(1)
, it is strictly dominant for the informed agent to make a
high effort in state H. Given this, because b > c
fHpiH(2)+fLpiL(1)
, it is (iter-
atively) strictly dominant for the uninformed agent to make a high effort.
Given this, because b > c
piL(2)
, it is (iteratively) strictly dominant for the
informed agent to make a high effort even in state L. Therefore, (1, (1, 1))
is the unique strategy profile that survives iterative elimination of strictly
dominated strategies, and hence, it is a unique equilibrium.
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3.3 m = 2 (full information)
Finally, with m = 2, it is necessary to incentivize an agent to choose a high
effort in any state even if the other agent does not work. Therefore, the bonus
must be at least c
piL(1)
. Given such a bonus level, it is strictly dominant for
each agent to choose a high effort in any state.
Lemma 3. b2 =
c
piL(1)
.
3.4 Optimal information structure
We now compare the three information structures discussed above. Recall
that b0 =
c
piφ(1)
is the bonus level that incentivizes an agent to work in the
average state, whereas b2 =
c
piL(1)
is the bonus level that incentivizes an agent
to work in any state, even if the other agent does not work. We have b0 < b2,
i.e., informing no agent is better than informing both agents.
The difference between m = 0 and m = 1 depends on the parameter
values.
Proposition 1. b1 ≤ b0 if and only if
piL(2)− piL(1)
piH(1)− piL(1) ≥ fH .
Proof. Observe that
b0 ≥ b1 ⇔ c
piφ(1)
≥ c
piL(2)
⇔ piL(2)− piL(1)
piH(1)− piL(1) ≥ fH ,
where the first equivalence is because we always have c
piφ(1)
≥ c
piH(1)
and
c
piφ(1)
≥ c
fHpiH(2)+fLpiL(1)
.
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The inequality in the statement implies that asymmetric information is
more likely to be optimal as (i) the “effort complementarity effect” on the
production function measured by piL(2)−piL(1) becomes greater, and (ii) the
“state effect” measured by piH(1) − piL(1) becomes smaller. This is because
(i) if the effort complementarity effect is more important, then the concern of
potential coordination failure is greater, and therefore, the benefit of asym-
metric information allocation becomes greater. On the other hand, (ii) if
the state effect is more important, then it is costly to incentivize an informed
agent in the low state, and therefore, informing no agent is likely to be better.
Remark 1. In a similar team-production context but without state uncer-
tainty, Winter (2004) shows that an asymmetric bonus contract outperforms
any symmetric bonus contract (Winter (2004) also allows for more than two
agents). Despite this result, in this paper, we focus on symmetric bonus
contracts in order to simplify the analysis. Whether our result qualitatively
changes or not with an asymmetric bonus contract as in Winter (2004) is a
natural question.
In our working paper version Moriya and Yamashita (2016), we exam-
ine several extensions and generalizations, including those with asymmetric
bonus contracts and more than two agents. We find that the qualitative
feature of the main result is basically robust to them, although the analysis
becomes more involved and richer. More specifically, (i) with more than two
agents, we need to consider how many agents should be informed, rather than
simply compare “no information” and “asymmetric information”. However,
the infimum bonus level given each information structure is derived from a
similar iterative-elimination argument, and the optimal number of informed
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agents is similarly determined by the relative magnitudes of the state effects
and effort complementarity effects. (ii) With asymmetric bonus contracts,
again the basic logic does not change, but the analysis becomes much more
complicated: even with two agents, we need to consider who should be in-
formed and who should be paid more, and different configurations could
admit different orders of iterative elimination. Nevertheless, in Moriya and
Yamashita (2016), we show that asymmetric information allocation is op-
timal under a similar but smaller set of parameter values. Although the
intuition is essentially the same (i.e., optimality of asymmetric information
allocation occurs when the effort complementarity effects are more impor-
tant than the state effects), a smaller set of such parameter values suggests
that asymmetric bonus contracts and asymmetric information allocations are
(imperect) substitutes in view of the principal.
4 Optimal general (stochastic) information struc-
ture
In the previous sections, we consider only deterministic information alloca-
tions, that is, each agent is either perfectly informed of θ or not informed at
all. However, in some cases, the principal may have more flexibility in terms
of precision of information provided to the agents. Furthermore, in case nei-
ther agent is fully informed, the correlation between the agents’ signals could
be an important variable to control too. Therefore, in this section, we study
the optimal general (possibly stochastic) information structure.
Given that the principal has flexibility in terms of information alloca-
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tion, our problem is related to the literature on Bayesian persuasion (e.g.,
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) and incomplete-information or Bayes cor-
related equilibrium (e.g., Forges (1993) and Bergemann and Morris (2013)).
However, these studies usually consider the problem of implementing a strat-
egy profile of interest as one of the equilibria by some feasible information
structures, and some techniques (most importantly, a version of revelation
principle) crucially hinge on such presumptions. On the other hand, our prob-
lem is to uniquely implement the full-effort strategy profile, and as shown in
the previous section, the key driving force for our problem comes from the
concern of eliminating “bad equilibria”. Thus, we cannot straightforwardly
apply those known techniques to our problem.11 Rather, our argument hinges
on the well-known property of the supermodular games (Topkis (1979), Vives
(1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1990)) that the lowest-effort equilibrium is
characterized by iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies “from
below”. Because of this property, our goal is essentially to find a feasible in-
formation structure (and a bonus level) such that only the full-effort strategy
profile survives this iterative elimination procedure.
A stochastic information allocation is given by (S1, S2, µ), where each Si
denotes the message space for agent i, and µ : Θ→ ∆(S1 × S2) is such that,
for each θ, µ(s1, s2|θ) represents the probability of sending si ∈ Si to each
agent i in state θ. For simplicity, we only consider finite and full-support
information structures in the sense that (i) each Si is finite, and (ii) for all i
11Indeed, as we show below, the optimal information structure may involve an infinite
number of messages/signals even though there are only two states and two actions. In this
sense, our result below provides a counterexample for a revelation principle in the context
of unique implementation.
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and si, there exists some θ and s−i such that µ(si, s−i|θ) > 0.
Our goal is to identify the infimum bonus level, denoted by b∗, with which
the high-effort profile is the unique equilibrium outcome regardless of the true
state, by carefully designing a stochastic information structure.
Theorem 1. b∗ = max{ c
piH(1)
, 2c
fH(piH(2)+piH(1))+fL(piL(2)+piL(1))
}.
To provide some intuition before the formal proof, we first consider the
case where
c
piH(1)
≥ 2c
fH(piH(2) + piH(1)) + fL(piL(2) + piL(1))
,
so that the statement reduces to b∗ = c
piH(1)
.12 This case holds if the “state
effects” represented by piH(x) − piL(x) for each x = 1, 2 are relatively small
compared to the “effort effects” represented by piθ(2) − piθ(1) for each θ. In
this case, even if an agent is informed that the state is H, he may not have
enough incentive to work if the other agent does not work. On the other
hand, once such a “never-work” strategy profile is eliminated, it is relatively
less costly to eliminate all the other “intermediate” strategy profiles. Thus,
we obtain b∗ = c
piH(1)
.
The other case with
c
piH(1)
≤ 2c
fH(piH(2) + piH(1)) + fL(piL(2) + piL(1))
holds if the state effects are large relatively to the effort effects. In this case,
an agent who is informed that the state is likely to be H has a large incentive
to work, and hence, the constraint that b∗ ≥ c
piH(1)
does not bind. On the
12Recall that this is the amount of bonus necessary to incentivize an agent in state H
if the other agent does not work.
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other hand, an agent who is informed that the state is likely to be L does
not have enough incentive to work, even if he knows that the other agent
works. To avoid this problem, the optimal information structure achieves
the following two properties simultaneously, by constructing a long chain of
messages: given each message (except for the “first” and “last” messages),
(i) each agent is made unaware that the state is L (even if it is so); and (ii)
each agent is confident that the other agent works with a sufficiently high
probability.
Proof. We first show that
b∗ ≥ max
{
c
piH(1)
,
2c
fH(piH(2) + piH(1)) + fL(piL(2) + piL(1))
}
.
Consider an arbitrary information structure (S1, S2, µ), and a bonus level
b with which the high-effort profile is the unique equilibrium outcome re-
gardless of the true state. Then, there exists some agent i and his message
si ∈ Si such that
b ·
∑
s−i,θ µ(si, s−i|θ)fθpiθ(1)∑
s−i,θ µ(si, s−i|θ)fθ
≥ c,
that is, agent i works given si even if agent −i does not work. Such message
must exist, because otherwise, it is an equilibrium where no one plays a high
effort given any message. This inequality then implies that
bpiH(1) ≥ c.
Let S1 ⊆ S1 denote the set of agent 1’s messages such that, when s1 ∈
S1, agent 1 works even if agent 2 does not work. As shown above, S1 is
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nonempty.13 Let T 1 = S1.
Let S2 ⊆ S2 denote the set of agent 2’s messages such that, with s2 ∈ S2,
agent 2 works if agent 1 works whenever s1 ∈ S1. By the logic above, S2
must be nonempty. Let T 2 = S2.
Inductively, for each k > 2 odd, let Sk ⊆ S1 \ T k−2 denote the set of
agent 1’s messages such that, with s1 ∈ Sk, agent 1 works if agent 2 works
whenever s2 ∈ T k−1. Then, let T k = Sk ∪ T k−2. Similarly, for each k > 2
even, let Sk ⊆ S2 \ T k−2 denote the set of agent 2’s messages such that,
with s2 ∈ Sk, agent 2 works if agent 1 works whenever s1 ∈ Sk−1. Then, let
T k = Sk ∪ T k−2.
For each k, we have
b[fH(µ(T
k−1, Sk|θ)piH(2) + µ(¬T k−1, Sk|θ)piH(1))
+fL(µ(T
k−1, Sk|θ)piL(2) + µ(¬T k−1, Sk|θ)piL(1))]
≥ c[fH(µ(T k−1, Sk|θ) + µ(¬T k−1, Sk|θ))
+fL(µ(T
k−1, Sk|θ) + µ(¬T k−1, Sk|θ))],
where µ(A|θ) = ∑s∈A µ(s|θ) for each A ⊆ S1 × S2, and ¬T k−1 denotes the
complement of set T k−1.
The sum of the left-hand sides for all k is
b[fH(piH(2) + piH(1)) + fL(piL(2) + piL(1))],
and the sum of the right-hand sides for all k is 2c. Thus,
b[fH(piH(2) + piH(1)) + fL(piL(2) + piL(1))] ≥ 2c.
13It is some agent i in the discussion above, but without loss of generality, we let this
agent be agent 1.
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Next, we show that
b∗ ≤ max
{
c
piH(1)
,
2c
fH(piH(2) + piH(1)) + fL(piL(2) + piL(1))
}
.
First, if
c
piH(1)
≥ 2c
fH(piH(2) + piH(1)) + fL(piL(2) + piL(1))
,
then the deterministic asymmetric information structure in our paper is op-
timal (Lemma 2). Hence, in the following, we assume
c
piH(1)
≤ 2c
fH(piH(2) + piH(1)) + fL(piL(2) + piL(1))
,
or equivalently,
2piH(1) ≤ fH(piH(2) + piH(1)) + fL(piL(2) + piL(1)),
and we show that
b∗ ≤ 2c
fH(piH(2) + piH(1)) + fL(piL(2) + piL(1))
.
Define gH by
gH =
fH(piH(2)+piH(1))+fL(piL(2)+piL(1))
2
− piL(1)
piH(1)− piL(1) ,
and let gL = 1− gH . We have gH > fH because
fH(piH(2)+piH(1))+fL(piL(2)+piL(1))
2
− piL(1)
piH(1)− piL(1) − fH
=
fH(piH(2)− piH(1)) + fL(piL(2)− piL(1))
2(piH(1)− piL(1))
> 0.
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Fix arbitrary M ∈ N, and let ε = fHfL
gHfL+2MgLfH
and α = gHfL−gLfH
gLfH(2M+1)
. Note
that ε, α > 0, and that ε, α→ 0 as M →∞. Consider the following informa-
tion structure (S1, S2, µ): S
1 = {s1, s3, . . . , s2M+1}, S2 = {s2, s4, . . . , s2M+2},
and µ is given as follows. For each k = 1, 2, . . . , 2M + 1,
µ(sk, sk+1|H) = gLε
fL
,
µ(sk, sk+1|L) = gLε(1 + α)
fL
,
µ(s1, s2M+2|H) =
(
gH
fH
− gL
fL
)
ε,
and µ(s, s˜|θ) = 0 for any other combination of (s, s˜, θ) ∈ S1 × S2 ×Θ.
For this to implement the full-effort strategy profile, the bonus must sat-
isfy
b(gHpiH(1) + gL(1 + α)piL(1)) ≥ (gH + gL(1 + α))c,
b(
fH
fL
(piH(2) + piH(1)) + (1 + α)(piL(2) + piL(1))) ≥ 2(fH
fL
+ 1 + α)c,
or equivalently b ≥ b(M), where
b(M) = max
{
(gH + gL(1 + α))c
gHpiH(1) + gL(1 + α)piL(1)
,
2(fH + fL(1 + α))c
fH(piH(2) + piH(1)) + fL(1 + α)(piL(2) + piL(1))
}
.
Taking the limit as M →∞, we have
b(M)→ 2c
fH(piH(2) + piH(1)) + fL(piL(2) + piL(1))
.
Therefore, for any δ > 0, there exists M > 0 such that
b(gH ,M) <
2c
fH(piH(2) + piH(1)) + fL(piL(2) + piL(1))
+ δ,
which implies that
b∗ ≤ 2c
fH(piH(2) + piH(1)) + fL(piL(2) + piL(1))
.
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The iterative elimination logic exploited in the construction of the optimal
information structure is reminiscent of the contagion arguments in email
games (Rubinstein (1989)) and in global games (Carlsson and van Damme
(1993), Frankel, Morris, and Pauzner (2003)). Interestingly, the contagious
information structures considered as instances in those papers prove to be
optimal in our context.14 It may be interesting to study whether similar
information structures become optimal (in certain senses) in other contexts,
in particular in certain class of supermodular games.
As a final corollary, we observe that the deterministic asymmetric infor-
mation allocation considered in the previous section continues to be optimal
under certain parameter values, even if we allow for stochastic information
allocations.
Corollary 1. If b1 =
c
piH(1)
, or equivalently, if
piH(1) ≤ min {piL(2), fHpiH(2) + fLpiL(1)} ,
then b∗ = b1(= cpiH(1)), that is, the deterministic information allocation in
Section 3 is optimal among all stochastic information allocations.
Proof. We have
fHpiH(1) + fLpiH(1) ≤ fHpiH(1) + fLpiL(2)
piH(1) ≤ fHpiH(2) + fLpiL(1).
14Kajii and Morris (1997) observe that, in the context of robust prediction in games, a
similar (though somewhat different) contagious information structure plays a crucial role
in their critical-path theorem. It is an open question as to whether there is some formal
link between our result and theirs.
21
Adding up both sides, we obtain
2piH(1) ≤ fH(piH(2) + piH(1)) + fL(piL(2) + piL(1)),
and thus, the previous theorem implies b∗ = c
piH(1)
.
5 Conclusion
This paper considers a team-production model with state uncertainty. When
the principal’s goal is to uniquely implement desired effort choices, we show
that, under certain conditions, asymmetrically informing the agents is the op-
timal information allocation. In this sense, by allocating information asym-
metrically, it becomes less costly to avoid badly coordinated equilibria. As
the degree of effort complementarity increases, asymmetric information allo-
cation tends to improve. On the other hand, informing an agent is always
costly in that this agent must be incentivized even in a low state, which is
the fundamental difference from other “divide-and-conquer” papers in the re-
lated literature (e.g., Winter (2004) in the team-production context), where
asymmetric bonus contracts unambiguously improve over symmetric ones.
While we show the robustness of this main intuition in a number of exten-
sions and generalizations in the working paper version Moriya and Yamashita
(2016), further research is necessary for a more comprehensive understand-
ing of desirable information allocation in organizations. We believe that the
analysis in this paper can serve as a useful benchmark for future research.
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